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Access to impartial and effective courts is the cornerstone
of democratic civil society. When the intention of political
actors is to extinguish democratic civil society, they often
wear away at the autonomy of the judiciary. International
law and the constitutions of many states throughout the
world guarantee access to autonomous courts. Despite
having such guarantees in place, the government of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has consistently attacked
the judiciary in order to erode its autonomy and bring it
under political control. Strategies used to achieve that goal
include purging judges, intimidating them, and preventing
judges from getting tenure. As a result, today there are two
parallel Venezuelan judiciaries competing for authority
while citing to the same constitution. This article will
present evidence regarding the methods through which the
autonomy of Venezuela’s courts was intentionally
destroyed by the Chavista government. It will begin by
looking at the history of the judicial power created by the
Constitution of 1999, analyze the specific acts that led to
the politicization of the courts, and explore the effects of
that
politicization
on
Venezuelan
constitutional
government.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The autonomous judiciary is a fundamental component of the
administration of justice. For that reason, guaranteeing access to
fair, independent, and autonomous courts is a basic human right.
Article 10 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights entitles all humans “in full equality to a fair . . . hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal.”1 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees that no person
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law, it
guarantees speedy trials for the accused, and prohibits inhuman

1
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, art. 10 (1948).
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treatment for prisoners.2 Such rules ensure the autonomy of the
courts as well as the independence from judges’ influence. But
what happens when politicians intentionally blur the lines
separating the branches of government to the point that judicial
autonomy and independence is effectively extinguished? That is
the case of the supreme court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia or
“TSJ”) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a country which
has adopted and ratified both the UN’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Venezuelan politicians undermined the independence of the
judicial branch of government by ignoring the separation of
powers set forth in the country’s constitution.3 In doing so, they
violated obligations under international treaties and the nation’s
constitution. The current Venezuelan constitution was adopted in
1999 (the “Constitution of 1999”) and completely reformed the
judicial, executive, and legislative branches of government.4 The
Constitution of 1999 intended to create a socialist republic that
guaranteed democratic, human, and social rights.5 In practice,
however, the new constitution weakened the institutions of
government6 while the executive branch steadily grew more
powerful. The year 2017 became a watershed year when the TSJ
nullified the legislature and ruled that the nation’s president may
unilaterally convene a constituent assembly to craft a new

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
175-76 (1966).
3
See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF
VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 1999. See also Acceso a la Justicia califica al TSJ como
(Jan.
10,
2017),
politizado
y
parcializado,
RUNRUN.ES
https://runrun.es/nacional/292643/acceso-a-la-justicia-califica-al-tsj-comopolitizado-y-parcializado/.
4
Marion J. Garcia-Serra, The Enabling Law: The Demise of the Separation
of Powers in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265,
274.
5
Reportajes (Vive Television broadcast Feb. 02, 1999), YOUTUBE (Feb.
02, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1s7rtjHqwnQ.
6
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 275.
2
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constitution.7 By nullifying the legislature, the judicial power in
Venezuela effectively cut the string of constitutional democratic
government and participated in an internal coup. As a result,
opposition politicians established a parallel legislature and judicial
in exile.8
This article will present evidence regarding the methods
through which the autonomy of Venezuela’s courts was
intentionally destroyed. It will begin by looking at the history of
the judicial power created by the Constitution of 1999, analyze the
specific acts that led to the politicization of the courts, and explore
the effects of that politicization on Venezuelan constitutional
government. Part II of this article will explore the promulgation of
the Constitution of 1999 and the historical context that led to its
downfall. Part III will delve into the intentional undermining of
democratic government through the erosion of judicial
independence by the Venezuelan government, looking specifically
at the Organic Law of the TSJ, the practice of appointing judges to
untenured temporary positions, the ouster of judges, and the case
of Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni. Part IV will delve into the final
collapse of the Venezuelan judicial, when the TSJ cut the string of
constitutional government in Venezuela and shattered its
legitimacy. Lastly, Part V will sum up the current state of the
Venezuelan judiciary and democratic government as established by
the Constitution of 1999.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

A History of the Constitution of 1999
The story of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 begins “with
the fall of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in January of 1958.”9 The
change in regime led to the Constitution of 1961, which ushered in
Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El Juez Constitucional vs. El Pueblo Como
Poder Constituyente Originario, 119 EDITORIAL JURIDICA VENEZOLANA, at 3-5
(2017)(Sp.).
8
Acceso a la Justicia califica al TSJ como politizado y parcializado, supra
note 3.
9
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 266.
7
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an extended period of prosperity and “an uninterrupted sequence of
peaceful and democratic transitions of power.”10 From the outside,
Venezuela seemed to be a model democratic society compared to
its neighbors in Latin America.11 However, internally, many
Venezuelans felt excluded from the political process.12 Political
life was dominated by two centrists parties, Accion Democratica (
“AD”) and Copei.13
Both political parties–along with a third party called the URD
that did not survive the 1970s–came to a power-sharing agreement,
by which they committed themselves to democratic government
and procedures when in power, and to serve as the “loyal
opposition” when out of power.14 An agreement called the Pact of
Punto Fijo.15 The Constitution of 1961 lent itself to the duopoly of
the Pact of Punto Fijo because that constitution was loosely
modeled on the United States’ Constitution. It had a tripartite
system in which a Presidente headed the executive, the legislature
was a bicameral institution called the Congreso Nacional (National
Congress), and the judicial branch was headed by a Corte Suprema
de Justicia (Supreme Court).16
The Supreme Court established by the Constitution of 1961
was a continuation of the Supreme Court first established by the
Constitution of 1830, which was the first constitution enacted after
Venezuela split from Simon Bolivar’s unified Gran Colombia that
same year.17 That Supreme Court was originally made up of a chief
magistrate and four other magistrates.18 When there was a vacancy
in the court, the president would nominate three potential
magistrates for each open seat, which were narrowed to two
10

Id.
Id.
12
Ricardo Combellas, El Proceso Constituyente y la Constitucion de 1999,
30 POLITEIA 183, 184 (2003).
13
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 267.
14
Id. at 268.
15
Id.
16
See generally VENEZ. CONST. OF 1961.
17
Constitucion de Venezuela de 1830 cumple 184 anos (Sep. 22 2016);
MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA COMUNICACIÓN Y LA INFORMACIÓN,
http://www.minci.gob.ve/constitucion-de-venezuela-de-1830-cumple-186-anos/.
18
See generally VENEZ. CONST. OF 1830, tit. 20.
11

142

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2

candidates by the Camara de Representantes (analogous to the
United States House of Representative); then the Senado
(analogous to the United States Senate) would elect a final
candidate from amongst those two.19 This procedure for selecting
judges incorporated the will of the people through the important
roles reserved for each house of the National Congress as well as
the presidency.20 While the Constitution of 1961 doubled the total
number of magistrates in the Supreme Court, the method for
selecting magistrates and required qualifications remained the
same as under the Constitution of 1830.21
However, the people’s confidence in the institutions
established by the Constitution of 1961 was eroded by widespread
nepotism and public corruption, which was rarely prosecuted.22 By
the 1980s, an insular political class had formed and many
Venezuelans felt that the political class was increasingly unable to
effectively respond to the nation’s woes.23 In that context of
political cronyism and corruption, the judicial branch of
government was often questioned for its ineffectiveness and
partiality.24
Although the Constitution of 1961 was not replaced until 1999,
there were many attempts to reform the Constitution of 1961
before the rise of Chavismo—with criticism of the Corte Suprema
being one of the main driving forces in favor of reform.25 By 1984,
the Congreso Nacional had created a commission to reform the
laws governing the judiciary.26 Those reforms proved to be
insufficient and in 1989 the National Congress formed another
commission with the express mandate to propose amendments to
the Constitution of 1961.27 (At that point the constitution had
already been amended in 1973 and 1983, but those amendments

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id.
Combellas, supra note 12, at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 185.
Id.
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had not affected the judiciary.)28 The 1989 commission released an
extensive list of proposed amendments just two years later.29
However, that list bitterly divided the members of the government
and constitutional reform was never adopted.30
The ruling parties’ inability to deal with the problems facing
Venezuelan society became clear on three separate occasions,
which compounded and simmered for nearly a decade: “Black
Friday,” the Caracazo, and the failed military coup of 1992.31
Those events shook the foundations of Venezuelan civil society to
the core and eventually resulted in the overhaul of the entire
Venezuelan government by a young lieutenant coronel who was
unknown at the time.
February 18, 1983 was “Black Friday.”32 The Venezuelan
currency, the Bolivar, “was severely devalued as a result of high
level of foreign debt and the declining price of oil. Most
Venezuelan’s [sic] living standards were affected detrimentally
and the flow of ‘petro-dollars’ that had financed generous social
policies and helped maintain the political patronage machines of
the two major political parties began to recede.”33 The inability to
pay for social programs, let alone expand them to draw in new
voters, further undermined respect for the political duopoly that
had dominated Venezuela since the Pact of Punto Fijo.34
Then, on February 27, 1989, popular frustration with the
traditional elite boiled over.35 Carlos Andres Perez, a one-time
president from the 1970s, won the presidency once more with
promises of increasing prosperity.36 He pushed reforms that
reduced government spending, but were very unpopular with the
struggling lower classes.37 An increase to the price of bus fare
“ignited a three day riot [in Caracas], resulting in extensive looting
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. 185 n.2.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 184.
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id.
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and over 1000 deaths,” which needed to be put down with the use
of military force.38 The Venezuelan people had shown deep-rooted
discontent with the political elite. Speaking of the Caracazo some
years later, President Rafael Caldera (Copei), who served from
1995-1999, said that “Venezuela has been a sort of pilot country.
At this moment, it is what the North Americans call a show
window . . . . That show window was shattered with fists, stones,
and sticks, by the hungry inhabitants of the barrios of Caracas.”39
President Caldera had tapped into a latent, yet incredibly
powerful sentiment in Venezuelan society: that the government
was rotten from the inside and needed rebuilding.40 In time, a
young army lieutenant coronel named Hugo Chávez Frias would
learn how to harness that political energy and remake the country.
Chávez was the leader of “a small cadre of junior military officers,
that had earlier complained of the politicized system of promotions
and of their new found duties of repressing popular protests,
[which] organized themselves as the Movimiento Bolivariano
Revolucionario – 200 (“MBR – 200”).”41 With no official political
ideology, the cadre was united by a shared sense that the
government was failing the people and that a great change was
necessary.42 On February 1992, the MBR – 200, leading about a
tenth of all army units in the country, mutinied and attempted to
take over the government.43 Shortly after it began, the rebellion
was quelled and the coup plotters arrested.44 Chávez was
incarcerated for his role in the coup.
B.

Constitutional Reform in 1999
Hugo Chávez attained the status of a political celebrity and
within a few years of MBR – 200’s attempted coup, President
Rafael Caldera released Chávez from prison.45 By the time of his
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 269.
Combellas, supra note 12, at 184.
Id. at 193.
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 270.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 272.
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release from prison, Chavez was a hero to the poor and
disenfranchised of Venezuela.46 The way was clear for an
ambitious political outsider to sweep aside the duopoly of AD and
Copei in the 1998 presidential elections.
Chávez was an optimistic visionary, who presented a
persuasive and idealistic vision of what the country could be.47 He
promised to spread the wealth from the nation’s vast reserves of
natural resources on programs to help the poor; to create a more
equitable and gentler nation where the poor and the historicallymarginalized indigenous population could have access to
prosperity.48 Canny observers noticed that “[h]is message of
overturning the entire political and economic order proved to have
. . . appeal to the impoverished masses who were eager for
dramatic change.”49 Chávez named his vision “21st Century
Socialism,” and assembled a political coalition which came to be
called the Movimiento Quinta Republica (Movement for a Fifth
Republic, the “MVR”). This vision was wildly popular, and
Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (“PSUV”) swept
aside all other parties to triumph on election day in 1998.50
The vehicle through which Hugo Chávez sought to implement
21st Century Socialism was a new constitution.51 While
campaigning for the presidency, he turned the convocation of a
constituent assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution into a
central issue of the election.52 He intended to hold a referendum to
ensure that his proposed new constitution had a popular mandate,
but the Constitution of 1961 did not establish a mechanism for
such popular referendums.53

Lauren Castaldi, Judicial Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The
Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the Complications of Rule of Law Reform,
37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 477, 479 (2006).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Combellas, supra note 12, at 188.
52
Id.
53
Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La Configuración Judicial del Proceso
Constituyente en Venezuela de 1999 o de Como el Guardian de la Constitución
46
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Already throughout the 1998 presidential campaign, the
Supreme Court had cast doubts as to the legality of such a
referendum. The Supreme Court had to weigh the underlaying
principles of democratic participation against their obligation to
uphold the Constitution of 1961.54 In January 1999, that court
handed the MVR a limited victory by holding that a referendum
could take place, but that such a referendum could not vest the
government with the authority to create institution tasked with
drafting a new constitution.55 Instead, the referendum could only
be used to gauge the people’s wishes as to whether they wanted a
new constitution and what types of guarantees that constitution
should provide.56
The referendum was held in April 1999 and resulted in an
overwhelming victory for the MVR government.57 Demonstrating
his strong political support, Chávez was able to win the
referendum by a margin of 92% in favor and 8% in opposition.58 In
July of the same year, another election was held for representatives
to the Constituent Assembly.59 Chávez’s coalition of leftist parties,
the Polo Patriotico, was able to win 121 out of a total of 128
members (the assembly had a total of 131 seats, 3 of those being
reserved for representatives from indigenous groups).60 With about
60% of the total votes, the Polo Patriotico won over 90% of
available seats.61
However, it is worth noting that there was widespread
abstention by the Venezuelan electorate. Slightly less than 38% of
eligible voters participated in the July election.62 For comparison,
about 64% of the electorate participated in the 1998 presidential

Abrió el Camino a Su Violación y Para su Propia Extinción, N° 77-80 REVISTA
DE DERECHO PUBLICO, 453 (1999).
54
Id at 456.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 273.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Combellas, supra note 12, at 193.
61
Id. at 193.
62
Id. at 192 n.17.
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election.63 Those high rates of abstention in the elections for
members of the Constituent Assembly are in large part due to the
questionable legality of the Constituent Assembly of 1999. Given
that there was no mechanism for establishing such an assembly in
the Constitution of 1961, the binding nature and legitimacy of the
referendum were widely questioned by the opposition to the MVR
government.64
After their overwhelming electoral victories, the MVR
government barred Congress from sitting in the Venezuelan
Capitol and from meeting and passing new laws.65 They then
removed eight judges from the bench.66 Opposition legislators who
attempted to enter the Venezuelan Capitol were removed by armed
forces.67 Finally, Cecilia Rosa, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, who had just months earlier given the Constituent Assembly
a limited mandate that expressly prohibited the dissolution of the
Congress and the Supreme Court, resigned, “stating that the court
would commit suicide rather than wait to be killed by the
[Constituent] Assembly.”68 Allan Brewer-Carias, a renowned and
influential Venezuelan jurist, who participated in the 1999
Constituent Assembly as an independent scholar, called the
Supreme Court’s decision to allow the referendum, which created
the “death sentence” of the autonomous judicial power in
Venezuela.69
The 1999 Constituent Assembly operated under a theory of
super-sovereignty, the idea that because the Constituent Assembly
was the result of a popular referendum and the leaders were all
63

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1998 Presidential Election Results,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: BASE DE DATOS POLITICOS DE LAS AMERICAS (Apr.
5,
2006)
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Venezuela/pre98.html;
Venezuelan 1998 Presidential Election Results, ELECTIONGUIDE.ORG (Mar. 17,
2005),
https://web.archive.org/web/20050317052156/http://www.ifes.org/eguide/results
um/venezuelares3.htm.
64
Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 27.
65
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 273.
66
Id. at 274.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 1.
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elected, the Constituent Assembly was the supreme representation
of the popular will and sovereignty.70 Under this theory, the
traditional branches of government were all subservient to the
Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly used that claim
to authority to replace Congress as the nation’s legislative body.71
Those usurped legislative powers were then used to pass an
Enabling Law72 that gave President Chávez expanded emergency
powers to enact laws that would otherwise have needed legislative
approval.73 President Chávez argued that the expanded powers
were necessary to combat the “emergencies” of high inflation and
a 10% unemployment rate. While Enabling Laws were permitted
under the Constitution of 1961 in cases of emergency, this was the
first time that such a law was passed without the participation of
Congress and the first time that the emergency powers were not
limited by scope and duration.74
The Constitution of 1999 was approved in a referendum by
71% of participating voters.75 However, due to the controversies
surrounding the Constitution of 1999, its reception was mixed. On
its face, the Constitution of 1999 is inherently democratic and
respects human rights.76 However, the years have shown that
implementation of the constitution has failed to ensure those
ideals.77
The Constituent Assembly itself undermined the constitutional
system that it had recently established. Not only did the
Constituent Assembly intentionally undermine the legislative and
judicial branches of government, it also suspended the local
elections for the year 2000, failed to follow adequate formalities
Combellas, supra note 12, at 195.
Id.
72
An enabling law is, a “law that permits what was previously prohibited or
that creates new powers; esp., a congressional statute conferring powers on an
executive agency to carry out various delegated tasks.” ENABLING LAW, Black's
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
73
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 274.
74
Id. at 274-75.
75
Id. at 276.
76
See generally CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE
VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 1999, (Venez.).
77
Combellas, supra note 12, at 205.
70
71

2020]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

149

(going so far as to change the text of the constitution after it was
approved by referendum), and created a transitional government
that was not elected, but appointed.78 By its acts, the Constituent
Assembly condemned the newly renamed Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to caudillo-style leadership.79 “One political observer
described [the Constitution of 1999] as establishing a political and
economic model that was ‘part Arab oil kingdom, part European
cradle-to-grave welfare state, with a dash of Latin American
authoritarianism thrown in.’”80
The Constitution of 1999 was an expansive document with 350
articles.81 The articles covered the structure and form of
government, as well as a wide array of social policies, rights, and
protections. For example, it gave the government increased powers
to intervene in the economy for the benefit of workers and
stipulated that the national oil company could not be privatized, as
its revenue was intended to pay for social programs.82 It overturned
existing labor laws and set a minimum wage that must be based on
the price of a basket of basic goods.83 The Constitution of 1999
guaranteed universal healthcare, education, pension, and
employment.84
The Constitution of 1999 significantly changed the structure of
government. The Supreme Court was replaced by the TSJ.85 The
bicameral Congress was replaced with the unicameral National
Assembly which had the power to pass Enabling Laws that gave
the president the power to enact legislation by decree.86 Aside from
such expanded powers, the president was given the right to call
referendums on national issues at will and to dissolve the National
Assembly.87
Id. at 206.
Id.
80
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 275.
81
Combellas, supra note 12, at 203.
82
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 275.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
See generally CONSTITUCIÓN DE
VENEZUELA Dec. 20, 1999, (Venez.).
86
Garcia-Serra, supra note 4, at 276.
87
Id.
78
79

LA

REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA

DE
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Many years after the adoption of the Constitution of 1999, the
famous Venezuelan jurist Allan Brewer-Carias wrote that the
actions of the Constituent Assembly constituted an internal coup
d’état.88 This was partially because there were widespread
irregularities in the process to draft a new constitution. The
referendum calling for the Constituent Assembly was called well
before the Supreme Court ruled that such a vote was
constitutionally permissible under the Constitution of 1961, and
was therefore illegally organized.89 When the Supreme Court
allowed the referendum, it gave the Constituent Assembly a
limited mandate which the Constituent Assembly ignored under
the theory of super-sovereignty.90 The dissolution of the Congress
as well as the disregard of the Supreme Court by the Constituent
Assembly meant that the Constituent Assembly had violated the
Constitution of 1961, which was still in effect despite the
Constituent Assembly’s belief that it outranked the institutions of
government created by the 1961 Constitution.91
Another important component of the Constitution of 1999 is
Title III Chapter I, which states in clear and unequivocal terms that
the Constitution of 1999 recognizes and shall comply with human
rights obligations under national law as well as international
treaty.92 It provides that human rights protections guaranteed by
treaty obligations shall be guaranteed to the people, even when
those protections are more expansive than the guarantees provided
under the 1999 Constitution,.93 As signatories to such treaties,
Venezuela’s obligations include guaranteeing fair and public trials
as well as procedural guarantees of due process. The Constitution
also states that equal protection under the law shall be given to all
Venezuelans regardless of political opinion so that all Venezuelans
are granted equality of human rights and liberties.94

Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 1-2.
Id.
90
Id. at 52.
91
Id. at 53.
92
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 20,
1999, art. 19 (Venez.).
93
Id.
94
Id.
88
89
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After winning a majority in Congress in 1999, MVR politicians
isolated the Supreme Court. Ivan Rincon Urdaneta, a supporter of
President Chavez, argued that the Supreme Court had
impermissibly limited the Constituent Assembly.95 Foreseeing
imminent destruction, the justices of the Supreme Court dissolved
the institution. After the adoption of the Constitution of 1999, Mr.
Rincon was rewarded for his loyalty by being appointed as the
president of the newly created the TSJ.96
III.

ASSAULT: HOW THE MVR GOVERNMENT USED
INTIMIDATION TO DESTROY JUDICIAL AUTONOMY.

The Constitution of 1999 did not create a judicial branch that
was subservient to the other branches of government per se;
instead, the actions of MVR politicians undermined judicial
autonomy. This section will look at the practices of the PSUV
government that served to destroy any notion of judicial autonomy
and independence in Venezuela.
Judicial autonomy is a requirement for democratic government
because the judiciary is the branch of government which ensures
that constitutional rules are followed. In a jurisdiction where the
judiciary is subservient to any or all other branches of government,
there is no institution which can hold the rest of the government
accountable. Absent a judiciary that is equal to the other branches
of government, the trappings of government serve as nothing more
than mere camouflage for despotism and tyranny. Judges protect
the people from those who would otherwise usurp the state’s
monopoly of force to become untouchable. That protection is not
only fundamental for democratic governance, it is an important
human right that countries must respect under international law.
A.

The Organic Law of 2004
Chapter III of the Constitution of 1999 established the nation’s
judiciary in about twenty articles, which created a set of complex
95
96

Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 52.
Id.
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rules for the judiciary.97 The rules created an independent
judiciary where magistrates have tenure for twelve years and are
chosen through popular participation.98 The Constitution expressly
sets minimum qualifications and coopted Venezuela’s legal scholar
community to ensure that judges elected by the masses were
qualified to hold their title.99 Article 267 set behavioral and
professional guidelines as well as a mechanism for the ouster of
tenured judges.100 According to its text, the judicial branch created
by the Constitution of 1999 was an independent and professional
institution which combined novel ideas of popular and academic
participation with the generally-political process of nominating and
ratifying judges. However, within five years, political turmoil led
to the promulgation of the Organic Law of the TSJ, which
undermined the guarantees of judicial autonomy and independence
in the Constitution of 1999.101
An organic law is a law that functions as the framework for
implementation of a constitutional regime.102 The concept of
organic laws is foreign to American jurisprudence,103 but such laws
are common throughout the world. Under the framework
established by the Constitution of 1999, they regulate and structure
government.104 Under the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999,
organic laws required a two-thirds majority to be enacted.105
Without securing a two-thirds majority, the MVR government
enacted the Organic Law of the TSJ in 2004 (Ley Orgánica del
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Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de la República Bolivariana de
Venezuela) supported by only a simple majority in the
legislature.106 According to Human Rights Watch, a nongovernmental organization which monitors and reports on
international human rights, there were other procedural problems
as well, such as the changing of the law’s text after it had been
approved in the legislature and the combining of multiple articles
to avoid debate in the legislature.107
The 2004 Organic Law of the TSJ had three important
provisions: it permitted the nullification of temporary and
provisional magistrates (discussed at length below); it raised the
number of magistrates of the TSJ from twenty to thirty-two; and it
changed the vote threshold for appointment of new magistrates.108
Before the reform, half of the twenty magistrates were allied with
the PSUV while the other half were in opposition, resulting in an
equilibrium where decision were not entirely predictable.109
However, after the reform, the twelve magistrates added to the TSJ
where firmly allied with the MVR.110 Whereas the original twenty
magistrates appointed under the Constitution of 1999 were all
confirmed by a two-thirds majority, under the Organic Law, new
magistrates and judges at all levels were appointed by a simple
majority of the MVR-controlled legislature.111 This put the TSJ
and all of its committees firmly in the hands of the MVR.
The Organic Law was the MVR’s response to the TSJ’s
supposed betrayal of the nation in 2002 and 2003. Despite having
widespread support, President Chávez had a powerful and stubborn
opposition. In April 2002, the opposition attempted a coup d’état
against President Chávez.112 Though the coup seemed successful at
first, within forty hours the PSUV government was restored.113
Wilkinson, supra note 101, at 17.
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109
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Then, in 2003, there were mass protests on the streets and a general
strike against the government which cost billions of dollars in lost
oil revenues for the state.114 As a result of those events, especially
the failed coup, Chávez began dismantling the very Constitution he
had fathered.115
Four months after the failed coup in 2002, the TSJ ruled (in an
eleven to nine decision) that it did not have jurisdiction to initiate
an investigation against four high-ranking military generals
suspected of being involved in the failed coup.116 President Chávez
quickly organized street protests throughout the country, calling
the decision a counterattack to his socialist revolution.117 He
attacked the judicial vigorously, calling them “immoral,”
“monstrous,” “a stain [on the country],” and calling for a book to
be published with the pictures of the eleven magistrates who voted
against investigation so that the people may know who they are.118
In a post published at the time in an official MVR blog, Chávez’s
son-in-law and current Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jorge Arreaza, wrote that the TSJ was not a legitimate institution
and claimed that the TSJ was biased and reached their decision
based on the magistrates’ personal political views.119 However, in
the same blog post he also concedes that the Attorney General
made ineffective arguments.120
Then, just a few months later, opposition politicians organized
a general strike, which included a strike by workers of the stateowned petroleum company, PDVSA.121 The PSUV government
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considered the strike to be “petroleum terrorism” and an
“economic coup d’état.”122 This led to another showdown with the
judicial branch of government because the MVR believed that the
lower courts–which were administered by the TSJ in accordance
with the Constitution of 1999—did not prosecute participants in
the strike with sufficient zealotry and severity.123
The strategy employed by the Chavistas in 2004 was
unconstitutional, but far from unique. Julius Caesar increased the
Roman Senate from 600 members to 900 members to reduce
opposition against him.124 Such actions are clearly designed to
undermine the institution’s ability to assert autonomy in ways that
are contrary to the politicians’ desires. One must also consider the
effects that flaunting of constitutional norms can have on the
courts. Courts are institutions that thrive on stability and
establishment of rigorous norms. The combination of increasing
the number of magistrates and disregarding the required procedure
for appointing new magistrates are fatal blows to judicial stability.
Unfortunately, these acts constitute the least egregious steps taken
to undermine judicial autonomy. The discrete undermining of
judicial authority would evolve into an open war of conquest
against the judiciary.
B.
Lack of Tenure: Temporary and Provisional Judges
Become the Norm
Judges are given tenure to prevent those who oversee them
from exerting influence on the courts by using their power of
appointment as leverage over individual judges. That is why many
consider tenure to be an indispensable aspect of judicial autonomy.
For example, in the United States, justices to the Supreme Court
have tenure and politicians are powerless to stop a justice who
“flips” and follows a different ideology from the one expected of
him or her by the party that nominated them. In Venezuela, the
MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA COMUNICACIÓN Y LA
INFORMACIÓN, BATALLA POR LA SOBERANÍA NACIONAL: DEL TERRORISMO
PETROLERO AL GOLPE ECONÓMICO (2012).
123
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Constitution of 1999 created a regime which granted tenure to
judges for twelve years and ensured their independence, but
authorities dispensed with those constitutional guarantees for
political convenience.125
Of the tools used by the MVR government to bring the judicial
under its control, the misuse of untenured temporary and
provisional appointments is amongst the most effective. According
to the Constitution of 1999, there are three ways to appoint
magistrates to the TSJ. The first is intended to be the norm
established by the constitution: legislative ratification of
magistrates for tenured twelve-year terms through a public
competition process.126 The second way, alternatively, is when a
permanent position in the TSJ is vacated, it can be filled by a
“provisional” appointment until that provisional judge can be
confirmed through the public competition process established in
the constitution and given tenure.127 The third type of appointments
are “temporary” judges, those appointed to serve as substitutes for
magistrates that are taking temporary leaves of absences for things
like health reasons or parental leave.128
Under the Constitution of 1999, the Judicial Commission of the
TSJ has the power to appoint temporary and provisional judges.129
It also has the power to dismiss temporary appointments without
cause, but not provisional appointments.130 However, the
Commission exercises that authority to dismiss provisional judges
summarily, though that would apparently violate the Constitution,
which specifically grants provisional judges a right to due process
before being dismissed.131 Nevertheless, summary dismissal of
provisional judges occurs as well. This gives the Judicial
Commission significant power over judges. When the Commission
has a judge’s career in their hands to do with as they please, it
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becomes easier to ensure that judge’s compliance in exchange for
receiving or retaining a judicial position.
The effect of the policy of appointing mostly untenured judges
is that “the independence of provisional [and temporary] judges is
significantly destabilized, preventing them from making rulings
based on the law rather than the desire of powerful outside
actors.”132 The system of temporary and provisional appointments
increases the leverage that politicians have over judges and forces
judges to consider the political implications of their decisions
before making them. It effectively gives the Judicial Commission,
which is presided by a loyal Chavista, the ability to replace judges
at will. There is no recourse for affected judges when the head
magistrate of the TSJ is also a renown PSUV partisan.
The president of the TSJ was Mr. Rincon, the very man who
bent the Supreme Court to the Chavista’s will in 1998, and the
president of the Judicial Commission of the TSJ, Luis Velazquez
Alvaray, was a legislator and member of the PSUV before joining
the TSJ.133 Together, they held the TSJ in a tight vice.
In 2003, 80% of the judges in Venezuela held provisional or
temporary positions.134 This means that out of the 1,772 judges in
the country, only 183 were tenured.135 This represents a significant
increase in the proportion of untenured judges since 1997.136 137 At
first, President Chávez initiated a recruitment drive to hire judges
to fill the positions held temporarily or provisionally, but the
process was slow due to the strict standards set by the Constitution
of 1999.138 By 2003, the government abruptly ended the attempt to
fill the bench with tenured judges ostensibly because the process
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was not working sufficiently well.139 However, opponents of the
government argue that the recruitment drive was stopped shortly
after the failed coup in 2002 so that the Judicial Commission of the
TSJ could hold political control over the judicial by naming and
removing judges at their discretion.140 The recruitment drive was
never restarted.
Meanwhile, the Judicial Commission has exercised its powers
to appoint and remove nontenured judges by fiat. In 2004, it
nullified the appointment of three Caracas judges who held
temporary appointments without any due process, hearing, or
notice.141 Other judges have reported to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights that they found their appointments
revoked when they ruled against the government.142 While a
magistrate may only be removed with two-thirds approval from the
National Assembly, under the 2004 Organic Law, “nullification”
of a temporary appointment can be achieved through a simple
majority.143 The Organic Law allowed the purging of the
Venezuelan judiciary to begin in earnest.
The practice of using temporary appointments to control the
judiciary violates the human rights of both the judge and the party
who is seeking redress from the tribunal. Under the United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “[e]veryone is
entitled in full equality to fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in determination of his rights
and obligations.”144 Here, the person seeking recourse from the
court is deprived of the ability to seek redress from an independent
and impartial body where judges can adjudicate disputes free from
outside influence and based solely on the application of law to
facts. As for the judges, their performance is judged by the same
political operators who appointed them. Those judges have no due
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process right to seek protection from arbitrary dismissal and many
suspect that they were dismissed for political reasons.145
The effect of such practices is very detrimental to judicial
autonomy and democracy. Lack of tenure affects judges on a
personal level, and without job security many of the brightest
jurists in the country seek careers outside the judicial system and
sometimes outside the country, where they will not be subject to
the whims of the political class. The bright minds that decide to
stay feel compelled by their careers to support Chavista political
ideology in order to obtain temporary and provisional
appointments. For those who stay within the judiciary and serve as
judges, political oversight is a reality, and decisions are made not
based on equity and the rule of law, but for the self-interest of the
judge and the politicians who control his or her employment.
When one considers that only a handful of exemplary victims are
often enough to bring others into line, it becomes apparent just
how powerful a tool the untenured appointments are for exercising
control over the judicial.
C.

The Purge: Summary Ousting of Judges
After the failed coup in 2002, there was plenty of kindling to
feed the fire that eventually consumed the Venezuelan judicial.
The MVR blamed the judiciary for siding with the coup plotters, as
the ten opposition-aligned TSJ magistrates of the twenty serving at
the time had sided with the plotters during the attempted coup by
declaring it legal.146 By 2004, Chávez and the MVR were secure
enough to lead a counterattack against the judiciary.147 That is why
in 2004, they instituted a regime of nullification through the
aforementioned Organic Law of the TSJ which allowed the
National Assembly to “nullify” appointments to the TSJ with a
simple majority.148 As PSUV legislator Iris Varela said at the time,
the regime of nullification was created specifically to expel the ten
magistrates who had sided with the coup plotters.149 Her words
145
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147
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were an explicit confirmation that the goals of the controls placed
on the judiciary in 2004 were to exercise political control over TSJ
decisions and to punish magistrates accused of being aligned with
the opposition.150 To that end, no tool was more useful than the
ousting of sitting judges.
The ousting of three Caracas trial judges for political reasons in
2004 ushered in the era of summary dismissals. Miguel Luna, Petra
Jimenez, and Maria Trastoy were dismissed on March 2004 after
receiving letters from TSJ President Ivan Rincon Urdaneta
“informing them that the TSJ Judicial Committee had decided to
nullify their appointments.”151 They were removed “due to
observations that were before [the TSJ Judicial Committee].”152
However, those observations were never made public, and Human
Rights Watch instead suggests that the firing was politically
motivated.153 All three judges had released detainees who had
allegedly participated in that year’s social unrest because there was
insufficient evidence to warrant the ongoing detention of the
suspects.154 The group included two opposition legislators.155
Notably, the decisions of each judge were affirmed by the
appellate court. When asked about the dismissals by Human Rights
Watch, Ivan Rincon Urdaneta argued that the three judges were
temporary appointments, and as such were not entitled to a hearing
before dismissal.156 However, none had temporary appointments.
Instead, Luna and Trastoy were provisional appointments
specifically entitled to due process under the Constitution of 1999,
while Jimenez was appointed as a “Special Substitute” and had
been serving at her post for more than three years at the time of her
dismissal.157
All three judges appealed their dismissal, but only Luna
received a response (first she was reinstated and then summarily
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dismissed once more shortly thereafter).158 Particularly worrisome
is the fact that the Caracas judges’ rulings enforced the laws
correctly—as shown by their subsequent confirmation on appeal—
and were only problematic because of their pollical significance.
Also worrisome is that their nullifications used a law that,
according to PSUV legislator Iris Valera, was created specifically
for the removal of opposition-aligned judges.159 Such arbitrary
dismissal of judges with the express intent to undermine judicial
autonomy is both unconstitutional and in violation of Venezuela’s
human rights treaty obligations to ensure that people have access to
autonomous and independent courts that will adjudicate questions
of rights and obligations.
Although provisional judges are entitled to due process
hearings before being dismissed, the TSJ showed in 2004 that it
would not apply such protections and treat provisional
appointments the same as temporary ones. In a country were about
80% of the judges serve under either provisional or temporary
appointments, this means that the vast majority of judges can be
removed with no explanation or opportunity to defend
themselves.160 In other words, “the constitutional regime does not
apply to a majority of the judges on the bench in Venezuela.”161
Before the dismissal of the three Caracas judges, an early
victim of the opening salvo of the war against judicial autonomy
was temporary Judge Mercedes Chocron. Judge Chocron
attempted to carry out a judicial inspection of a military base
where an opposition-aligned general was being held to ensure that
his detention complied with human rights treaty obligations set by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.162 After that,
she was dismissed by the TSJ Judicial Commission, which gave no
reasoning other than their absolute authority to dismiss temporary
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judges.163 They noted that such dismissals “cannot be questioned
or subject to review.”164
In other cases, MVR politicians intimidated entire courts and
then dismissed them altogether. Such was the fate of the First
Administrative Court (“CPCA”), the second highest court in
Venezuela, which had national jurisdiction over cases involving
challenges to administrative actions by the government.165 Due to
its occasional rulings against MVR policies, President Chávez
publicly denounced the CPCA on several occasions. For example,
in response to a 2003 ruling that Cuban doctors sent by the Cuban
government to work as volunteers in poor communities could not
practice medicine in Venezuela without first being certified by the
Venezuelan medical association, he called it “judges who
shouldn’t be judges,” even telling it to go shove their rulings
“where you want,” and encouraging the people to ignore CPCA
decisions.166
Before taking the drastic step of dissolving the CPCA, the
MVR government attempted to intimidate that court into
submission. Aside from the insults mentioned above, President
Chávez called the chief judge of the CPCA a “criminal.”167
Intelligence services arrested one of the judge’s driver and held
him in prison for thirty-five days.168 The driver was charged with
mishandling documents under the pretense that the documents that
he carried on the day of his arrest, which were seized by police
officers during the arrest, had fallen into the hands of third parties
(i.e. the arresting officers themselves). Despite the driver’s later
acquitted by the TSJ (which at this point still had only twenty
magistrates), the arrest is viewed by many as an attempted
intimidation.169 Later that year, the public prosecutor conducted a
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surprise search of the CPCA courthouse accompanied by heavily
armed police.170
In 2003, the TSJ shut down the CPCA and dismissed its four
sitting judges.171 Based on a recommendation submitted to it by the
Inspector General of the Judiciary, the TSJ determined that an
“inexcusable error” in a decision rendered the year before was
grounds for the dismissal of the judges.172 Three of the judges
appealed the decision, but their appeals were ignored by the TSJ.173
When asked why the appeals had been ignored, TSJ President
Rincon Urdaneta explained that their appeals were “not a high
priority” and asserted that new judges would be appointed to take
over the CPCA.174 However, to this day, the CPCA remains
shut.175 This political maneuver has had the effect of entirely
removing the means for popular redress against administrative
laws, reducing overall access to justice for the Venezuelan people
and seriously undermining the principles of democratic
government.
The summary firing of judges is effective because it works on
many different levels simultaneously. On the most basic level,
firing a “problematic” judge gets rid of a political enemy. To those
who do not value the independent judicial and see the judicial as
another branch of government in which to wage partisan warfare,
that goal presents sufficiently strong motivation. The flip side of it
is yet another benefit for the partisan politicians, as the MVR can
fill empty seats with government supporters who will tow the party
line. While summarily dismissed judges are visible victims of the
government’s policy, those who remain are the silent victims that
must suffer intimidation constantly. Every fired judge becomes yet
another example to sitting judges of the consequences of incurring
the government’s wrath. The fear of losing one’s job becomes
amplified as empty posts are filled with partisans who are
searching for new “traitors.” “Furthermore, because they can be
170
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freely removed, . . . judges are more susceptible to both political
and private pressures” when making rulings.176 The ultimate effect
of the policy of arbitrary dismissal of judges is that judicial
autonomy is significantly undermined, preventing judges from
making ruling based on the law rather than the desires of powerful
outside actors.177
D.
All the Strategies Come Together: The Case of Judge
Maria Lourdes Afiuni
Although the war against the independent judiciary in
Venezuela first gained steam in the years following the failed coup
of 2002, it continued uninterrupted for many years after that. Not
only did the events mentioned above still affect judges many years
later, but new attacks against judges and efforts to politicize the
judiciary were launched. Perhaps none is as illustrative, colorful,
and heartbreaking as the case of Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni.
On December 2009, Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni was
imprisoned on charges of fraud after incurring the wrath of
President Hugo Chávez.178 The president’s anger was forceful and
aggressive. He called her a “bandit” and demanded that the judge
“be sentenced to a [thirty]-year prison term, even if new legislation
was required to achieve that result.”179 The charges against Judge
Afiuni came just days after she granted habeas corpus and
conditionally released Eligio Cadeño, a prominent Chavista banker
who was awaiting trial for evading government currency controls
and diverting resources by requesting twenty-seven million (USD)
in foreign currency to import goods which he never imported to the
country.180
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Under Venezuelan law, a suspected criminal may be held in
pretrial detention for a maximum of two years before charges must
be pressed or the suspect released.181 By his release on December
2009, Mr. Cedeño had spent two years and ten months in pretrial
detention without a trial being undertaken against him.182 This was
a violation of Mr. Cadeño’s constitutional rights as well as
international treaty obligations to guarantee speedy trials where an
accused could defend himself against the charges alleged against
him. By the time of his release, Mr. Cadeño’s imprisonment had
been noticed and condemned by multiple international human
rights organizations. Independent experts on human rights from the
United Nation’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had
condemned Mr. Cadeño’s treatment as early as September of that
year.183 Judge Afiuni granted Cadeño conditional release while
awaiting trial, and just a few days later she “was arrested by
intelligence police officers.”184 Her crime, according to observers,
was enforcing Venezuela’s constitutional and international due
process obligations against the wishes of President Chávez.185
According to media reports, President Chávez had a special
interest in the case against Mr. Cadeño, and an ax to grind against
the defendant. In 2003, Rosa Virginia, one of Chávez’s two
daughters began dating Gustavo Arraiz, a business partner of Mr.
Cadeño.186 During that time, Rosa Virginia and Gustavo allegedly
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filmed themselves having intimate relations.187 Local media
reported that the video found its way to the hands of President
Chávez, who accused Mr. Cedeño of using the video to blackmail
the President.188 After this alleged attempt to blackmail, Mr.
Cedeño was imprisoned without trial until his release by Judge
Afiuni.189 Immediately upon release, Cedeño fled to the United
States where he was given asylum.190
The truth of the media allegations is unproven, since the matter
was never brought to trial. What is beyond dispute, however, is
that Mr. Cadeño was held without trial for a period of ten months
beyond the allowable maximum time.191 MVR politicians failed to
see that the problem was not Judge Afiuni, who followed the law,
but those who attempted to do something which was illegal. The
punishment meted out to Judge Afiuni for her refusal to aid and
abet the government in violating the law was a travesty.
Judge Afiuni was imprisoned from 2009 until 2013 because of
her actions in the Cedeño Case.192 Shortly after her arrest by
intelligence forces, President Chávez appeared on national
television and radio calling her a bandit, asking for new legislation
that would allow the government to punish Judge Afiuni more
severely, and expressly instructed the attorney general and
president of the TSJ to punish her as severely as possible “to
prevent similar actions by other judges.”193 Afiuni was charged
with corruption, accessory to an escape, criminal conspiracy, and
abuse of power.194
Mr. Cedeño’s lawyers were publicly accused of engaging in
criminal conduct.195 One of those attorneys, as well as the two
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bailiffs that escorted Mr. Cedeño out of court were briefly arrested
as well.196 Judge Afiuni was imprisoned in a women’s prison along
with many convicts that she had sent to that same prison.197 In the
same year, another judge from the court of appeals was demoted
after ruling that Mr. Cedeño’s pretrial detention had exceeded the
legal limit.198
International non-governmental organizations were quick to
condemn the actions taken by the government against Judge Afiuni
as violations of her human rights. Human rights experts from the
UN called the treatment of Judge Afiuni “a blow by President
Hugo Chávez to the independence of judges and lawyers in the
country.”199 They further stated that “‘[r]eprisals for exercising
their constitutionally guaranteed functions and creating a climate
of fear among the judiciary and lawyers’ profession serve no
purpose except to undermine the rule of law and obstruct
justice . . . . The immediate and unconditional release of Judge
Afiuni is imperative.’”200
In response to the Afiuni Case, the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights criticized “the absence of an
effective separation and independence of the public branches of
power in Venezuela.”201 The international watchdog Human Rights
Watch also criticized the detention as it led to the “‘dramatic
erosion of judicial independence in Venezuela under Chávez” and
considered that “it is very difficult to expect that she will get a fair
trial.’”202
Judge Afiuni’s treatment is a clear violation of her human
rights to recourse to a fair tribunal and protection from torture.
Judge Afiuni, who has since been conditionally released, claims
that she was the victim of physical, emotional, and sexual
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torture.203 In a 2015 filling to the United Nations in Geneva, Judge
Afiuni and her lawyers alleged, and presented evidence to prove,
that authorities destroyed her anus, vagina, and bladder by raping
and sexually torturing her.204 She claims that once she was beat
with such savagery that a boot kick from a National Guardsman
destroyed one of her breasts as well.205 According to Afiuni, prison
officials intentionally placed women she had convicted in the cell
next to hers and that those women would regularly beat her and on
multiple occasions threw gasoline into her cell in order to light a
fire and roast her alive.206 Prison authorities did nothing to stop the
harassment when she complained.207 On another occasion, Judge
Afiuni was transferred to a hospital for a gynecological procedure
and was forced to strip naked in front of 20 National
Guardsmen.208 Attorney General Luisa Ortega Diaz denied
Afiuni’s claims in a UN hearing.209
Judge Afiuni was conditionally released in 2013 and is
prohibited from leaving the country.210 She describes her treatment
by saying that “in six years they destroyed my life, my daughter’s
life, and my whole family.”211 Surely, few people would risk
exposing themselves to the horrors that Judge Afiuni faced.
Judge Afiuni’s case brings together all the strategies employed
by the MVR government since 1999 to undermine judicial
autonomy and destroy democracy in the country. She was removed
from office easily, thanks to her untenured position and the
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executive’s authority to do so under the Organic Law of 2004. Her
court was bullied and intimidated when one of the lawyers
involved and the bailiffs who released Cadeño were arrested. Judge
Afiuni was publicly criticized, then arrested and intimidated
through torture. The message to all other judges in the country was
clear: the president expected compliance from the judiciary, and he
would stop at nothing to get it.
Judge Afiuni’s case illustrates how the use of the strategies
discussed above undermine constitutional government to such an
extent as to turn an otherwise-democratic government into a
despotic tyranny. When a president has so much power to control
the judiciary, it cannot be said that such a president may be bound
by the democratic limitation placed upon them by their nation’s
constitution. Consequently, this reality violates the people’s human
right to access fair courts that will apply due process of law.
IV.

2017: THE YEAR THE TSJ AND CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT BROKE DOWN
From the establishment of the TSJ in 1999 until 2017, the
various attacks against the Venezuelan judicial ate at its
foundations like termites until it collapsed. In 2017, the TSJ
removed the final façade of constitutional legitimacy by allowing
President Maduro to unilaterally call another Constituent
Assembly and by a series of rulings that held that the legislative
powers of the National Assembly now belonged to the unilaterallyconvened Constituent Assembly.212
President Maduro was the hand-picked successor of Hugo
Chavez who died of cancer in March 2013 after a long fight with
the disease.213 Nicolas Maduro, a high school drop-out turned
union organizer took over the reins of power in Venezuela.214
President Maduro’s use of the Venezuelan judiciary as a
weapon in his war against opposition politicians began after the
See generally GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE
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2015 elections, which saw the MVR lose control of the legislature
for the first time in their sixteen years of power.215 After that
election, Maduro began to strike at the legislature by expanding
executive power further than Chavez ever had.216 Taking
advantage of the economic crisis facing the country, President
Maduro unilaterally granted himself emergency powers for sixty
days.217 Under Article 339 of the 1999 Constitution, Maduro was
well within his rights to do so, as well as to unilaterally extend
those emergency powers for another sixty-day term.218 However,
the constitution explicitly prohibits the extension of the term
beyond 120 days without approval by the National Assembly.219
After the 120-day period of his initial declaration, President
Maduro simply gave himself unilateral emergency powers for
another sixty days, extended that power another sixty days, and
repeated the process as needed.220 In this way, President Maduro
has maintained emergency powers for over two years, executing
over thirteen emergency decrees in that time.221 During that time,
President Maduro exercised both executive and legislative powers,
passing laws that had little to do with fixing the crisis-stricken
economy and took few steps to solve the economic emergency that
served as the pretext for his expanded powers.222
Despite the blackletter law of Article 339 that clearly prohibits
the president from unilaterally invoking emergency powers for
more than 120 days, the TSJ ruled that those powers may be
renewed perennially by President Maduro.223 As a matter of fact,
while the Constitution explicitly grants the National Assembly the
right to revoke emergency powers under Article 339, the TSJ
prohibited the National Assembly from exercising that power,
TSJ concreto disolución de la Asamblea Nacional en 2017, ACCESO A LA
JUSTICIA (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.accesoalajusticia.org/tsj-concretodisolucion-de-la-asamblea-nacional-en-2017/.
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using the argument that the National Assembly was illegal and
therefore did not have that right. 224 Acceso a la Justicia, a
Venezuelan NGO which tracks justice and judicial independence
in Venezuela, explained the TSJ’s actions eloquently when they
wrote that it is “very clear that the [TSJ] performs a role opposite
of its mandate, by permitting the disintegration of the Carta Magna
[Constitution] with unconstitutional states of exception [i.e.
emergency powers] when its function under Article 334 is to
ensure the integrity of the Constitution.”225
Following the opposition’s electoral victory in the legislative
elections of December 2015, the TSJ took the unusual step of
nullifying the election of four opposition-aligned legislators from
the state of Amazonas before they could swear-in the following
January, on the grounds that “irregularities” had taken place in
their elections.226 Without those four deputies, the opposition fell
short of a two-thirds majority in the legislature.227 The TSJ
decision came just one day after a petition claiming irregularities in
the election process was filed by Nicia Maldonado, a former
minister of the environment in Chávez’s cabinet who had lost the
election against one of the four legislators now barred from
office.228 Many jurists and NGOs were quick to criticize the TSJ
decision, as the election had already been completed and ratified,
so according to the Constitution of 1999, the TSJ’s jurisdiction
over electoral affairs did not apply to the case at hand.229 Further,
the TSJ decision came over the National Assembly’s Christmas
vacation and there was no way for a fair hearing to be held before
the inauguration of the new legislature in early January.230
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Therefore, the National Assembly allowed the deputies from
Amazonas to take their office.231
In January, the TSJ ordered the National Assembly to expel the
four deputies in question or be dissolved.232 This was again in
response to a request by Ms. Maldonado which was reviewed and
ruled on within a mere four days by the Electoral Committee of the
TSJ.233 The National Assembly was forced to comply, and the
deputies were suspended from their posts.234 The deputies that
were suspended appealed to the TSJ, which took 211 days to
answer their appeal by merely confirming that they were currently
suspended.235 The decision was “contrary to the express justice in
favor of the PSUV.” 236 The seats remained empty for the duration
of the National Assembly’s term, until that entire body was
subsequently ordered to dissolve by the TSJ.237
At this early point in the legislative wars, a series of TSJ
decisions clarified its PSUV-aligned stance. Early in 2016 the TSJ
confirmed the constitutionality of President Maduro’s perennial
unilateral grant of emergency powers.238 They cited statutes to
argue that, despite the text of the Constitution, those statutes
prohibited the TSJ from intervening in cases where emergency
powers are invoked.239 Around the same time, the TSJ rendered
another decision that directly contradicted the text of the
Constitution, which established a process by which the executive
must present a periodic accounting of his or her actions to the
legislature.240 They ruled that the National Assembly had no
authority to oversee the executive and that President Maduro was
not legally required to account for his actions to the legislature, just
to himself.241
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The TSJ’s August 2016 decision to dissolve the National
Assembly was a watershed moment in the constitutional history of
Venezuela. Seizing on the purported irregularities in the election of
the deputies from Amazonas, the TSJ refused to confirm the new
legislature.242 This limbo lasted until the summer, when the
President of the National Assembly submitted the credentials of
the deputies elected to the National Assembly yet again, but this
time excluding the deputies from Amazonas.243 Five days later, the
TSJ dissolved the entire National Assembly and declared it
“invalid [and] inexistent”; its laws having no judicial
enforceability.244 It argued that the second inauguration of the
deputies had been irregular and therefore every legislation passed
by it was invalid.245 In early 2017, the National Assembly held
another inauguration where it tried to appease the TSJ and obtain
its approval.246 However, the TSJ found new irregularities in the
process and dissolved the National Assembly once more, ruling
that all National Assembly decisions and legislation in 2017 were
voided as well.247
During this period, the TSJ struck down the National Assembly
often. In 2016, it closed an investigation into corruption in the
national petroleum company (known by its Spanish-language
acronym, PDVSA) undertaken by opposition deputies arguing that
the investigation “was not in the country’s best interest.”248
Instead, it directed the executive branch to investigate Deputy
Freddy Guevara, the legislator who had spearheaded the
investigation into PDVSA.249 In another decision they allowed the
executive to incur debts and sell state assets without legislative
approval as required by law.250 In 2016 the TSJ began filling
empty seats in the National Election Council–the supposedly
242
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independent branch of government that is tasked with overseeing
elections–though that power was expressly granted to the National
Assembly by the Constitution. However, during this period the
most consequential ruling of the TSJ was the approval of the
Constituent Assembly.251
In a decree published on May 2017, President Maduro invoked
the powers of the presidency to unilaterally invoke a Constituent
Assembly to craft a new constitution.252 The Constitution of 1999
sets clear rules for both the amending and the replacement of that
constitution.253 It requires that any change be approved by the
president, a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, and a
majority vote in a referendum where at least fifteen percent of
registered voters participated.254 The 2017 decree did not have the
latter two approvals.255 Instead, the TSJ relied on an inexplicably
absurd interpretation of the language, based on the positioning of a
single comma in the text of the constitution read entirely outside
the context of the document, to rule that the requirements above
are necessary for an amendment to the constitution but not for
replacing it entirely.256 That interpretation completely ignored the
text of the constitution, which explicitly states elsewhere that the
popular will must be manifested before a constituent assembly can
be called.257 The TSJ’s interpretation effectively created an entirely
new procedure for replacing the constitution that was not included
in the constitution.258 Brewer-Carias plainly calls the ruling a
“constitutional fraud.”259 He points out that according to the TSJ’s
decision, there would need to be a popular referendum, two-thirds
legislative approval, and executive approval to change a single
letter in the constitution, but that the constitution can be wholly
thrown out and replaced based only on the president’s unilateral
251
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decree.260 He calls the decision a “constitutional aberration” and a
“usurpation of popular will” that is “arbitrarily assigned to the
President.”261 The 1999 Constitution, which placed a large
emphasis and importance on popular participation, is incompatible
with the TSJ ruling. 262
The TSJ supported President Maduro’s efforts to create
Constituent Assembly at every turn. Aside from their interpretation
granting legality to the president’s decree, other rulings ensured
that the MVR retained actual power.263 The first decision dealt
with the election of members for the Constituent Assembly.264
President Maduro had proposed a voting system by which voters
are divided into economic sectors and voting groups were based on
a voter’s profession.265 Despite another law, which stipulated that
the popular will shall be measured in a popular vote, the TSJ ruled
that no voting system is perfect and Maduro’s proposal was
legal.266 Observers were quick to note that members of the poor
working classes that traditionally supported Chavismo had an
insurmountable advantage when they could vote in this way.267
Indeed, Maduro’s partisans won every single seat in the
Constituent Assembly.268 Once elected, the exclusively Chavista
Constituent Assembly was invested with full legislative powers.269
It now sits in “illegal substitution of parliament” and approves
laws, including the national budget, strips National Assembly
deputies of their parliamentary immunity, orders investigations,
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and carries out other activities reserved for the National Assembly
under the Constitution.270
When the Constituent Assembly was vested with legislative
powers, the constitutional order had broken down irreparably.
Luisa Ortega Diaz, the attorney general who denied Judge Afiuni’s
torture allegations just a couple of years before, left her post and
attempted to fight the new order through the courts, but achieved
very little success.271 Her husband, a legislator from the PSUV,
joined her in protesting the new order.272 He was stripped of his
parliamentary immunity by the TSJ and indicted on corruption
charges.273
As a response to the subordination of the judicial power in
Venezuela, and as a result of the TSJ’s lack of legitimacy, an
opposition-aligned TSJ was inaugurated at the OAS headquarters
in Washington D.C.274
The National Assembly’s eighteen
nominees to the TSJ, which had been rejected because the TSJ
considered the National Assembly nullified, began working in the
parallel TSJ along with another fifteen magistrates.275 President
Maduro immediately ordered the arrest of all thirty-three
magistrates on charges of usurping the judicial power.276 All of the
magistrates escaped, except for one magistrate who was arrested
by intelligence services before escaping the country and charged
with treason in a military court, despite the fact that he was not a
member of the military.277 According to the International Human
Rights Court, military jurisdiction must be limited to members of
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the military or to “crimes or offenses that based on their own
nature threaten the juridical rights of the military order itself.”278
The parallel TSJ holds session outside of Venezuela, and its
rulings are binding to the extent that they are recognized by
international organizations.279
V.

CONCLUSION: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE VENEZUELAN
JUDICIARY
At what point must one acknowledge that judicial
independence and democracy in Venezuela does not exist? Surely,
in its current state with a parallel supreme court and parallel
legislatures, there is no escaping the conclusion that the current
state of the Venezuelan judiciary is in utter disrepair and
representative democracy does not exist.
The first blow to the judiciary was not ill-intentioned and did
not necessitate the final collapse, it was the election of Chávez and
the subsequent creation of the Constitution of 1999. That
constitution respected the separation of powers and guaranteed
human rights to the people of Venezuela. It came after decades of
neglect of the poor by the political class and was intended to
ensure a more equitable country. However, by replacing rather
than amending the old constitution, the door was left open to the
imposition of charisma over law. The decisions to bend the rules to
ensure their political goal of a new constitution confirmed to the
MVR that while they remained popular, they could undermine the
institutions of government. The new constitution also created the
Constituent Assembly process for drafting a new constitution. This
power was ultimately usurped by President Maduro and used to
sideline the National Assembly.
The next blow came with the Organic Law which the MVR
enacted illegally and used to pack the court with their supporters. It
opened the door to the widespread use of untenured appointments
and nullification of magistrates. Unlike the Constitution of 1999,
the Organic Law could not be said to be the product of good
278
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intentions. The goal of the law was specifically to ensure the
loyalty of the judiciary and to give the MVR the ability to remove
judges that did not follow directions. It was clearly intended for the
exercise of political control over the judiciary.
The widespread use of temporary appointments was a blow to
judicial independence and freedom. One that was much more
damaging than those which preceded it. The decision to appoint
judges temporarily and provisionally so as to deny them tenure is
largely responsible for the current state of the Venezuelan judicial.
Judges became afraid to make rulings according to their
conscience. Eventually, the careers of over eighty percent of the
country’s judges depended on the whims of those in power.280
Politicians used that power to nefariously control the judiciary.
The ouster of judges had a similar and intertwined detrimental
effect on the Venezuelan judiciary. The ousting of judges goes
hand-in-hand with the temporary appointments because the
Organic Law permitted the nullification of untenured posts.
However, failure to renew a post does not have the same effect as
firing a person from that post. Seeing the ouster of judges who
were supposed to be protected by the constitution was a powerful
deterrent against ignoring the will of the MVR.
The case of Judge Afiuni is similarly terrifying from the
perspective of a judge in Venezuela. Ms. Afiuni was punished for
following the law in accordance with a prisoner’s human rights.
For that “crime” she was imprisoned for many years, tortured, and
raped. This is a textbook example of using force as a deterrent,
except that it was perversely applied to a judge and not a criminal.
By extension, it was also applied to all judges in Venezuela,
because they all witnessed the sacrificial lamb on its way to
slaughter.
If the Venezuelan judiciary can be said to have survived the
early 2000s and the Afiuni case, there is no dispute that it did not
survive the legislative war of 2016-2017. By that point, the TSJ
was so eroded that they simply used circular logic to ensure
whatever outcome was politically palatable. Its attempts to
delegitimize the National Assembly had that very effect on itself.
280
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The judiciary pushed the country towards having parallel
legislatures and parallel supreme courts.
While the Constitution of 1999 was not destined to fail, the
way that it has been implemented means it must be entirely
replaced. Although the public participation for selecting judges
may be salvaged from the Constitution of 1999, any new
constitution should do away with provisional judgeships, should
ensure that all judges and citizens be entitled to due process under
the law, and should prohibit acts of public intimidation to influence
judges. However, first there must be a political revolution to
wrestle power away from the MVR and return it to the people.

